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On January 23, 2012, in United States v. Jones, 1 the United States
Supreme Court handed down. the surprisingly unanimous opinion that
the warrantless attachment of a GPS tracking device to a private automobile violated the Fourth Amendment.
Just four months prior, following a moot court proceeding conducted at the William and Mary School of Law's annual Supreme
Court Preview, a panel of distinguished lawyers, journalists, and law
professors voted almost unanimously that, based on current Supreme
Court precedent, there was no such violation. How could the panel,
said to be selected from the "nation's leading legal scholars ... [and]
lawyers who have argued a combined total of more than 200 cases
before the Court," 2 have been so wrong? Doubtless the participants
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of Law. He served in three positions in the Reagan administration, including Chairman of the Legal Services Corporation. The authors filed two amicus curiae briefs in
the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Jones, practicing constitutional law together at the Vienna, Virginia law firm of William J. Olson, P.C. The firm's website
is http://www.lawandfreedom.com. The authors thank their co-counsel on the two
amicus briefs, John S. Miles, Jeremiah L. Morgan, Joseph W. Miller, Mark B. Weinberg, Gary W. Kreep, and Robert J. Olson, for editorial suggestions.
1
132 S.Ct. 945 (2012).
2
Institute of Bill of Rights Law, IBRL Hosts Annual Supreme Court Preview Sept. 23-24, WILLIAM & MARY LAW SCHOOL (Sept. 20, 2011),
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read the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit panel's August 6,
2010 opinion that favored Mr. Jones, certainly they were privy to the
winning arguments that Jones had made before that court,3 and no
doubt they had the benefit of the exchange of opinions in the court of
4
appeals which had denied the Government's motion for a rehearing.
Perhaps more importantly, available to the moot court participants
was the Government's petition seeking Supreme Court review, and
Jones' s Response. In its petition, the Government presented only one
question for decision: "Whether the warrantless use of a tracking device on [respondent's] vehicle to monitor its movements on public
streets violated the Fourth Amendment." 5 The Jones response presented two issues, the first of which was only a more detailed variation of the question presented by the Government. The second question, however, was new: "Whether the government violated respondent's Fourth Amendment rights by installing the OPS tracking device
6
on his vehicle without a valid warrant and without his consent."
I. THE SUPREME COURT DEFINES THE ISSUE AT THE
PETITION STAGE: PROPERTY, NOT JUST PRIVACY

Jones' s claim that the installation of the OPS tracking device was
an unreasonable search because the Government agents had trespassed
http://law.wm.edu/news/ stories/2011/ibrl-hosts-annual-supreme-court-preview-sept.23-24 .php.
3 See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh 'gen
bane denied sub nom. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The
Court of Appeals decision also resolved the appeal of Lawrence Maynard, a codefendant of Mr. Jones in the conspiracy case, whose conviction was upheld. The
panel consisted of the opinion's author, Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg (appointed by
President Ronald Reagan), Judge David S. Tatel (appointed by President Bill Clinton), and Judge Thomas B. Griffith (appointed by President George W. Bush). Biographical Directory ofFederal Judges, UNITED STATES COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/BiographicalDirectoryOfJudges.aspx
(last visited Apr. 10, 2012).
4 The United States' Petition for Reconsideration and the Jones opposition
brief was appended to the Government's Petition for Certiorari. See Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, Appendix at 45a-52a, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011 WL
1462758. Although the petition for rehearing en bane was denied, Chief Judge David
B. Sentelle and Circuit Judges Janice Rogers Brown and Brett M. Kavanaugh would
have granted the petition. Jones, 625 F.3d at 767.
5 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at I (emphasis added).
6 Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Jones, 132 S. Ct.
945 (No. 10-1259), 2011WL2263361 (emphasis added). Jones's counsel Stephen C.
Leckar, Esq. recruited former acting Solicitor General Walter Dellinger to join him as
co-counsel on the briefs at both the petition and merits stages, but Mr. Leckar argued
the case for Mr. Jones on November 8, 2011.
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onto Jones's private property was only briefly sketched out in the last
page and a half of Jones's response brief. However, Jones expressly
asked the Court to "also grant review of th[is] alternative argument
[which] Jones raised in the D.C. Circuit ... that the court had no occasion to resolve." 7 The question whether the installation itself was
constitutional, Jones contended, turned on a '"property-based Fourth
Amendment argument' . . . antecedent to the question on which the
government seeks review." 8 In support, Jones cited D.C. Circuit Court
Judge Kavanaugh who, in dissent to the court of appeals' denial of the
Government's petition for a rehearing, had stated that the Fourth
Amendment "'protects property as well as privacy,"' 9 and that the
property issue was "'an important and close question. "' 10 The Government's Reply Brief gave even less attention to Jones' s second issue, rejecting out of hand the notion that installation could be a search
or a seizure, and never even mentioning the word property. II
Despite only passing consideration of this "property-based"
Fourth Amendment question from the parties, the Supreme Court had
the benefit of an amicus brief urging the Court that, if it were to grant
the petition, it should do so because the case presented "a historic
opportunity to reconsider the rationale for its current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence based upon reasonable privacy expectations, and
to restore its earlier Fourth Amendment jurisprudence based upon
protecting both the sanctity of private property and the civil sovereignty of the people."I 2 In short, the amicus brief urged the Court to
discard the modem "reasonable expectation of privacy" test, and re7
Id. at 33.
s Id.
9
Id. (quoting Soldal v. Cook Cnty, 506 U.S. 56, 62 (1992)).
10
Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 33, Jones, 132 S.
Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011WL2263361.
11
Reply Brieffor the United States at 9-11, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 101259), 2011WL2326714,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/hr
iefs/10-1259_petitionerreply.authcheckdam.pdf.
12
Brief for Gun Owners of America, Inc. et. al. as Amici Curiae on Petition
for Writ of Certiorari Supporting Neither Party at 3, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 101259), 2011WL1881813,
http://www.lawandfreedom.com/ site/constitutional/USvJones_amicus. pdf (This amicus curiae brief, the only such brief filed at the petition stage, was filed on behalf of
neither party, rejecting Jones's position that the Petition should not be granted, and
significantly differing with the Government's position as to why review should be
granted. The other amici on the brief were Gun Owners Foundation, Institute on the
Constitution, Restoring Liberty Action Committee, U.S. Justice Foundation, Conservative Legal Defense and Education Fund, Free Speech Coalition, Inc., Free
Speech Defense and Education Fund, Inc., DownsizeDC.org, Downsize DC Foundation, and Lincoln Institute for Research and Education). Id.
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appeals which had denied the Government's motion for a rehearing.
Perhaps more importantly, available to the moot court participants
was the Government's petition seeking Supreme Court review, and
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an unreasonable search because the Government agents had trespassed
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panel consisted of the opinion's author, Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg (appointed by
President Ronald Reagan), Judge David S. Tatel (appointed by President Bill Clinton), and Judge Thomas B. Griffith (appointed by President George W. Bush). Biographical Directory ofFederal Judges, UNITED STATES COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/BiographicalDirectoryOfJudges.aspx
(last visited Apr. 10, 2012).
4 The United States' Petition for Reconsideration and the Jones opposition
brief was appended to the Government's Petition for Certiorari. See Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, Appendix at 45a-52a, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011 WL
1462758. Although the petition for rehearing en bane was denied, Chief Judge David
B. Sentelle and Circuit Judges Janice Rogers Brown and Brett M. Kavanaugh would
have granted the petition. Jones, 625 F.3d at 767.
5 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at I (emphasis added).
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Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Jones, 132 S. Ct.
945 (No. 10-1259), 2011WL2263361 (emphasis added). Jones's counsel Stephen C.
Leckar, Esq. recruited former acting Solicitor General Walter Dellinger to join him as
co-counsel on the briefs at both the petition and merits stages, but Mr. Leckar argued
the case for Mr. Jones on November 8, 2011.
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Brief for Gun Owners of America, Inc. et. al. as Amici Curiae on Petition
for Writ of Certiorari Supporting Neither Party at 3, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 101259), 2011WL1881813,
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tum the Fourth Amendment to the textual and historic protection of
private property. 13 On June 27, 2011, the Supreme Court granted the
Government's petition and, in addition, directed the parties "to brief
and argue" the property issue sought by Jones in his Brief in Opposition.14
At the William and Mary moot court proceeding, the arguments of
counsel, questions posed by the court, and the court's explanation of
its decision all presumed that the case would be decided by application of the Court's privacy test to the Government's first issue. However, that was not to be the basis on which the Jones case would be
decided.
II. THE TREATMENT OF THE PROPERTY ISSUE
AT THE MERITS STAGE

The property question-the second issue on which certiorari had
been granted-was addressed, after a fashion, in both parties' briefs
on the merits. The Government's opening brief trivialized the installation of the tracking device as neither a search nor a seizure-a meaningless interference with Jones's "possessory interest in [his] vehicle."15 The Government mentioned the word "property" three times in
its four page analysis. 16 Jones's Brief for Respondent stressed his
common law right to exclude others from any interference with his
possessory interest. 17 The Government replied: "[w]hile the GPS device was in place, respondent remained free to use his vehicle however he wanted. He went where he wanted, he transported anyone and
anything he wanted, and none of the operational systems of the vehicle were affected in any way." 18
Despite this one exchange, and Jones's discussion of property interests generally, Jones's property claim did not play a major role in
either party's merits brief. Rather, both parties were understandably
preoccupied with winning their case under established Supreme Court

13

See Id. at 7-23.
U.S. Supreme Court Docket, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/10-1259.htm.
15
Brieffor Petitioner at 39, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011 WL
3561881.
16
Brief for Petitioner at 42-46, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011
WL 3561881.
17
Brief for Respondent at 47-48, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011
WL4479076.
18
Brief for Petitioner at 18, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-1259),
2011WL3561881.
14
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Fourth Amendment jurisprudence-whether the GPS tracking device
infringed upon Jones' s reasonable expectation of privacy.
Such was also the case in all but three of the thirteen amicus curiae merits briefs filed. Ten of those briefs focused almost exclusively
upon the Fourth Amendment privacy test. 19 Only three, filed by the
Fourth Amendment Historians, the Constitution Project, and Gun
Owners of America, addressed Jones' s property claim as a substantial
one. 20 Of these three, only the Gun Owners of America brief urged the
revival of the Fourth Amendment text as one designed to protect the
people's private property, rejecting the Court's revisionist "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test. 21
It came as no surprise that, at oral argument, counsel for the Government began with a citation to Katz v. United States, 22 the seminal
modem Fourth Amendment privacy, case, stating "that visual and
beeper surveillance of a vehicle traveling on the public roadways infringed no Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy." 23 What was
surprising, however, was how quickly the property question came into
play. Just minutes after Government counsel had come to the podium,
19

Brieffor ACLU & ACLU of the Nation's Capital as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011WL4802713; Brief
for CATO Inst. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No.
10-1259), 2011WL4614426; Brieffor Ctr. on the Admin. of Crim. Law as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011 WL
3706106; Brieffor Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011WL4590838; Brieffor
Council on Am.-Islamic Relations as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Jones,
132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011WL4614428; Brieffor Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. &
Legal Scholars and Technical Experts as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent,
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011WL4564007; Brieffor Nat'l Ass'n of
Crim. Def. Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Jones, 132 S. Ct.
945 (No. 10-1259), 2011WL4614427; Brieffor Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers
Ass'n, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 101259), 2011WL4614423; Brieffor Rutherford Inst. & Nat'l Motorists Ass'n as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011 WL
4826981; Brieffor Yale Law Sch. Info. Soc'y Project Scholars as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondent, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011WL4614429.
20
See Brief for Constitution Project as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011WL4614424; Brieffor Fourth
Amendment Historians as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Jones, 132 S. Ct.
945 (No. 10-1259), 2011WL4642657; Brieffor Gun Owners of America, Inc. et. al.
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011
WL4590837.
21
See Brief for Gun Owners of America, Inc. et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 8-34, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011WL4590837.
22
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
23
Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259),
http ://www. supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/ 10-125 9. pdf.
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Justice Scalia interrupted with a revealing historical "prologue" to a
simple question:
[W]hen wiretapping first came before this Court, we held
that it was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment because
the Fourth Amendment says that the ... people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. And wiretapping just
picked up conversations. That's not persons, houses, papers
and effects.
Later on, we reversed ourselves, and, as you mentioned,
Katz established the new criterion, which is, is there an invasion of privacy? Does -- are you obtaining information
that a person had a reasonable expectation to be kept private?
I think that was wrong. I don't think that was the original
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. But nonetheless, it's
been around for so long, we're not going to overrule that.
However, it is one thing to add that privacy concept to the
Fourth Amendment as it originally ·existed, and it is quite
something else to use that concept to narrow the Fourth
Amendment from what it originally meant. And it seems \o
me that when that device is installed against the will of the
owner of the car on the car, that is unquestionably a trespass
and thereby rendering the owner of the car not secure in his
effects -- the car is one of his effects -- against an unreasonable search and seizure. It is attached to the car against his
will, and it is a search because what it obtains is the location
of that car from there forward. Now, why -- why isn't that
correct? Do you deny that it's a trespass? 24
Government's counsel readily admitted that "[i]t may be a technical trespass," but that "the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to
protect privacy interests and meaningful interferences with possessory
interests, not to cover all technical trespasses." 25 To which, Justice
Scalia responded: "So ... the privacy rationale doesn't expand [the
Fourth Amendment] but narrows it in some respects." 26 Fudging the
question, counsel replied: "It changes it." 27
Just as quickly as the property/privacy issue arose it disappeared,
as the Government counsel and various members of the Court wres24
25
26
27

Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 23,
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 23,
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 23,
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 23,
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at 7, 8.
at 8.
at 8.
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tied with the contours of the Court's privacy test in a search for principled limitations on the use of modern technological developments. 28
Although the property issue reappeared at various times in the dialogue between Jones's counsel and the Court, 29 Jones's property
claim failed to come to focus as it had with Government counsel. Nor
did the property issue reappear during Government counsel's rebuttal. 30 Indeed, a reading of the transcript might give rise to the impression that the Court would probably stay the course, assessing the constitutionality of the GPS tracking device by the Katz privacy test, not
by a revitalized private property one. Not surprisingly, in his recap of
the oral argument, Lyle Denniston, a seasoned legal reporter now with
SCOTUSblog, saw absolutely no chance for the case to be decided on
the theory that the installation of the GPS tracking device was a trespass upon private property of the kind forbidden by the Fourth
Amendment. 31
ID. THE SUPREME COURT REVITALIZES THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVATE PROPERTY
PRINCIPLE

Just two and one-half months· after oral argument, the Supreme
Court announced its decision. Although all nine Justices voted in
favor of Jones, the Court was divided five to four on the reasons why.
Sticking with the modern, Katz-based "reasonable expectation of
privacy" rationale, four Justices found in favor of Jones because "a
reasonable person would not have anticipated" the "degree of intrusion" found here: "four weeks ... track[ing] every movement that
respondent made in the vehicle he was driving." 32
The concurring Justices candidly recognized that they could not
draw a firm line as to when GPS tracking would cross over the constitutional privacy line. Indeed, they acknowledged that their test was
"not without ... difficulties," and "involves a degree of circularity,"
which tempted ''judges ... to confuse their own expectations of priva28

See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 23, at 9-11.
See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 23, at 28, 30, 36.
30
See generally, Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 23, at 57-61.
31
Lyle Denniston, Argument recap.for GPS, get a warrant, SCOTUSBLOG
(Nov. 8, 2011, 2:12 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=131423 (noting that Jones's
attorney seemed "to get bogged down, at least early in his argument, on whether the
police had engaged in a 'trespass' simply by putting the device on the vehicle in the
first place. Most of the members of the Court were not notably impressed with seeing
the case through that perspective.").
32
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., Ginsburg, J.,
Breyer, J., and Kagan, J., concurring).
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Justice Scalia interrupted with a revealing historical "prologue" to a
simple question:
[W]hen wiretapping first came before this Court, we held
that it was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment because
the Fourth Amendment says that the ... people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. And wiretapping just
picked up conversations. That's not persons, houses, papers
and effects.
Later on, we reversed ourselves, and, as you mentioned,
Katz established the new criterion, which is, is there an invasion of privacy? Does -- are you obtaining information
that a person had a reasonable expectation to be kept private?
I think that was wrong. I don't think that was the original
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. But nonetheless, it's
been around for so long, we're not going to overrule that.
However, it is one thing to add that privacy concept to the
Fourth Amendment as it originally ·existed, and it is quite
something else to use that concept to narrow the Fourth
Amendment from what it originally meant. And it seems tp
me that when that device is installed against the will of the
owner of the car on the car, that is unquestionably a trespass
and thereby rendering the owner of the car not secure in his
effects -- the car is one of his effects -- against an unreasonable search and seizure. It is attached to the car against his
will, and it is a search because what it obtains is the location
of that car from there forward. Now, why -- why isn't that
correct? Do you deny that it's a trespass? 24
Government's counsel readily admitted that "[i]t may be a technical trespass," but that "the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to
protect privacy interests and meaningful interferences with possessory
interests, not to cover all technical trespasses." 25 To which, Justice
Scalia responded: "So ... the privacy rationale doesn't expand [the
Fourth Amendment] but narrows it in some respects." 26 Fudging the
question, counsel replied: "It changes it. " 27
Just as quickly as the property/privacy issue arose it disappeared,
as the Government counsel and various members of the Court wres24
25
26
27

Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 23,
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 23,
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 23,
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 23,

at 6-7 (emphasis added).
at 7, 8.
at 8.
at 8.

UNITED STATES V JONES

249

tled with the contours of the Court's privacy test in a search for principled limitations on the use of modem technological developments. 28
Although the property issue reappeared at various times in the dialogue between Jones' s counsel and the Court, 29 Jones' s property
claim failed to come to focus as it had with Government counsel. Nor
did the property issue reappear during Government counsel's rebuttal. 30 Indeed, a reading of the transcript might give rise to the impression that the Court would probably stay the course, assessing the constitutionality of the GPS tracking device by the Katz privacy test, not
by a revitalized private property one. Not surprisingly, in his recap of
the oral argument, Lyle Denniston, a seasoned legal reporter now with
SCOTUSblog, saw absolutely no chance for the case to be decided on
the theory that the installation of the GPS tracking device was a trespass upon private property of the kind forbidden by the Fourth
Amendment. 31
ill. THE SUPREME COURT REVITALIZES THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVATE PROPERTY
PRINCIPLE

Just two and one-half months· after oral argument, the Supreme
Court announced its decision. Although all nine Justices voted in
favor of Jones, the Court was divided five to four on the reasons why.
Sticking with the modem, Katz-based "reasonable expectation of
privacy" rationale, four Justices found in favor of Jones because "a
reasonable person would not have anticipated" the "degree of intrusion" found here: "four weeks ... track[ing] every movement that
respondent made in the vehicle he was driving." 32
The concurring Justices candidly recognized that they could not
draw a firm line as to when GPS tracking would cross over the constitutional privacy line. Indeed, they acknowledged that their test was
"not without ... difficulties," and "involves a degree of circularity,"
which tempted ''judges ... to confuse their own expectations of priva28

See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 23, at 9-11.
See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 23, at 28, 30, 36.
30
See generally, Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 23, at 57-61.
31
Lyle Denniston, Argument recap.for GPS, get a warrant, SCOTUSBLOG
(Nov. 8, 2011, 2: 12 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=131423 (noting that Jones's
attorney seemed "to get bogged down, at least early in his argument, on whether the
police had engaged in a 'trespass' simply by putting the device on the vehicle in the
first place. Most of the members of the Court were not notably impressed with seeing
the case through that perspective.").
32
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., Ginsburg, J.,
Breyer, J., and Kagan, J., concurring).
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cy with those of the hypothetical reasonable person to which the Katz
test looks." 33
What appeared to unite the four concurring Justices was not a
preference for the Katz test, but their anathema toward the private
property-based majority opinion, accusing their colleagues of "decid[ing] this case based upon 18th-century tort law" for. conduct that
34
might have given rise to "a suit for trespass to chattels."
Justice Scalia's majority opinion met this sharp critique head-on:
That is a distortion. What we apply is an 18th-century guarantee against unreasonable searches, which we believe must
provide at a minimum the degree of protection it afforded
when it was adopted. The concurrence does not share that
belief. It would apply exclusively Katz's reasonableexpectation-of-privacy test, even when that eliminates
35
rights that previously existed.
This exchange reveals that the five-member majority did not subscribe to its opinion solely to dispose of the case before them (unlike
the concurring opinion), but to take a first step toward restoring the
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to its textual and historic
foundation-a foundation rooted in the common law of private property. 36 On this point, Justice Scalia and his four colleagues were adamant; after quoting the Fourth Amendment, Justice Scalia observed:
The text of the Fourth Amendment reflects its close connection to property, since otherwise it would have referred
simply to "the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures"; the phrase "in their persons,
37
houses, papers, and effects" would have been superfluous.
Immediately preceding this textual analysis, Justice Scalia ap38
pealed to history. Citing Entick v. Carrington, as quoted in Boyd v.
40
United States, 39 and as affirmed in Brower v. County ofInyo, Justice
33

Id. at 962.
Id. at 957.
35 Id. at 953 (italics original, bold added).
36 For a discussion of Fourth Amendment foundational principles and their
emphasis on property rights, see Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth
Amendment, or the Rights ofRelationships, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1606-07 (1987).
37 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 (emphasis added).
38 Entick v. Carrington (1765), 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.).
39 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
34
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Scalia declared Entick to be a '"monument of English freedom'
with regard to . . . the significance of property rights in search-andseizure analysis .... " 41 Justice Scalia went on to quote from that decision to say:
"[O]ur law holds the property of every man so sacred, that
no man can set his foot upon his neighbor's close without his
leave; if he does he is a trespasser, though he does no damage at all; if he will tread upon his neighbor's ground, he
42
must justify it by law."
In her separate concurrence, Justice Sotomayor (who also joined
wholeheartedly with the majority) emphasized the doctrinal significance of the majority's fresh textual and historic commitment:

Justice Alito's approach, which discounts altogether the constitutional relevance of the Government's physical intrusion
on Jones' Jeep, erodes that longstanding protection for privacy expectations inherent in items of property that people possess or control. ... By contrast, the trespassory test
applied in the majority opinion reflects an irreducible constitutional minimum: When the Government physically invades personal property to gather information, a search occurs. 43
Having established the property principle as the base standard by
which claims of search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment are
to be measured, Justice Scalia turned to the role that the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test was to play in the future. First, he noted that the test cannot "narrow the Fourth Amendment's scope." 44
Next, he explained why: "The.Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy
test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespasso45
ry test. Thus, Justice Scalia's approach-in contrast to the way Justice Alito portrays it-would apply both the Katz reasonableexpectation-of-privacy test and the rekindled trespassory test.
Brower v. Cnty. oflnyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989).
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
42
Id. (quoting Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 817).
43
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor J., concurring) (emphasis added).
44
Id. at 951.
45
Id. at 952. Justice Sotomayor characterized the majority's approach as
c~aiming that "Katz's reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test augmented, but did not
displace or diminish, the common-law trespassory test that preceded it." Id. at 955
(Sotomayor J., concurring).
4o
41
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IV. PROPERTY PRINCIPLES PLUS JUDICIAL
EXPEDIENCY

Rather than expressing concern that the Jones majority's originalist trespassory theory was too broad, Justice Alito feared it would provide no Fourth Amendment protection against "long-term monitoring
[if it] can be accomplished without committing a technical trespass ..
46
•• "
Of special concern was the "vexing problems in cases involving
surveillance that is carried out by making electronic, as opposed to
physical, contact with the item to be tracked" 47 :
Would the sending of a radio signal to activate this system
constitute a trespass to chattels? Trespass to chattels has traditionally required a physical touching of the property. In recent years, courts have wrestled with the application of this
old tort in cases involving unwanted electronic contact with
computer systems, and some have held that even the transmission of electrons that occurs when a communication is
sent from one computer to another is enough. But may such
decisions be followed in applying the Court's trespass theory? Assuming that what matters under the Court's theory is
the law of trespass as it existed at the time of the adoption of
the Fourth Amendment, do these recent decisions represent a
change in the law or simply the application of the old tort to
new situations? 48
Apparently for this reason, the four concurring justices opted for
the "Katz expectation-of-privacy" as the sole Fourth Amendment
test, 49 relegating "existence of a property right [as] but one element in
determining whether expectations of privacy are legitimate." 50 While
not completely confident that this privacy test would be effective in
protecting privacy in a changing technological world, Justice Alito
was convinced that the majority's property-based approach certainly
would not. 51
According to both Justices Scalia and Sotomayor, however, the
majority's trespassory test does not displace the Katz privacy test, the
46
47
48
49
50

51
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Id. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 962.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 960 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183 (1984)).
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962-64.
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latter having been "added to, not substituted for, the common law
52
trespassory test." Thus, both Justices contradicted Justice Alito's
assumption that the majority's trespassory test would preclude utilization of the Katz test where electronic surveillance was conducted
without physical trespasses on a person's property. 53 To be sure, Justice Scalia's opinion acknowledges that Katz "deviated from [previous
Court opinions'] exclusively property-based approach" 54 but that does
not mean that it "deviated" from the Fourth Amendment text. To the
contrary, Justice Scalia makes it clear that he finds the Katz holding 55
to be consistent with the text, namely, "that the Fourth Amendment
protects persons and their private conversations . . . ." 56 What concerned Justice Scalia about Katz was that its test, 57 while derived from
the property-based text, could be applied to narrow the Fourth
Amendment's protection. 58 Hence, the Jones opinion is designed as a
corrective adjustment to ensure that the privacy test does not stray
from the "minimum . . . degree of protection it afforded when it was
adopted. " 59
While the majority opinion seeks to marry property and privacy,
there is considerable tension in the relationship. Justice Scalia's
originalist return to the textual property foundation of the Fourth
Amendment is now joined with an atextual privacy test to be employed whenever the Court chooses to use it to protect the People
from electronic surveillance. In short, the majority endorsed a fixed
constitutional principle supplemented by a judicially-forged pragmatic
balancing test. 60
The fundamental problem with the Katz test is that it is an artificial judicial construct with no connection to the Fourth Amendment.
52

Id. at 952; id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (describing the trespassory test as an "irreducible constitutional minimum").
53
See id. at 953, 955.
54
Id. at 950.
55
Id. (observing how in Katz 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) the Court said that
"the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places" thus overruling Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928), where the Court held that wiretaps on
public telephone lines were not a search under the Fourth Amendment because
"[t]here was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants").
56
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951.
57
Justice Scalia makes special note that the "reasonable expectation of privacy test" comes not from the majority opinion in Katz, but from Justice Harlan's
concurrence. Id. at 950.
58
See id. at 953 (observing that the concurring Justices would "apply exclusively Katz's reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, even when that eliminates rights
that previously existed.").
59 Id.
60
Id. at 953-54. See also Id. at 954-55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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The Court did not purport to adopt privacy because of some new insight or scholarship as to the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment in 1791. Indeed it could not have, as the seed of what has become the "right of privacy" was contained in a law review article by
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis published nearly a century
after the Fourth Amendment's ratification. 61 In that article, Warren
and Brandeis proposed that the "next step" in the development of
common law was to create a cause of action for violation of a person's
"right to privacy." 62-a right not then in existence (in the common
law or as a right contemplated by the authors of the Constitution), but
one that should be fashioned for the future. 63 Over the years, the Court
has tried to justify the right to privacy as one of the "penumbras,
formed by emanations from" 64 the Fourth Amendment, using the type
of analysis which makes sense only to lawyers. 65 While the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis has been elevated to iconic
status, it remains divorced from its Fourth Amendment foundation,
and its use actually endangers the protection designed by the Founders
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
While Justice Scalia's decision is exemplary-so far as it goesthe Court has not yet come to grips with rectifying the full measure of
damage that was done to the Fourth Amendment's protection of the
People by the reasonable expectation-of-privacy test. The modem test
did not just narrow the scope of the Fourth Amendment's property
principle by overriding the common-law trespassory test, it also eviscerated the Fourth Amendment's protection against "searches and
seizures" for "mere evidence" in violation of the private property interests that the Fourth Amendment originally protected. It remains to
be seen whether returning the Fourth Amendment to its property
foundation in Jones will lead to a decision reestablishing the Fourth
Amendment's protection of the people that, as discussed below, long
had been known as the "mere evidence rule."
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V. THE NEED TO RETURN TO THE
MERE EVIDENCE RULE
Although there is no way to anticipate the future direction of the
Court, a principled way of escape from the Court's simultaneous embrace of textual property principles and the atextual privacy test can
be found: a complete return to the Founders' Fourth Amendment as
generally adhered to by the Court until the late 1960s. 66 This includes
a return to the "mere evidence rule" first comprehensively articulated
in a seminal case that Justice Scalia cited only in passing-Boyd v.
United States. 67
The first provision of the Fourth Amendment limits the government as follows: "The right of the People to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " 68 From the ratification of the Constitution until 1967, the mere evidence rule provided that certain types of
searches were "unreasonable" per se, and could not be cured even by
a warrant which met the test of the second provision of the Fourth
Amendment. According to the Court, even search warrants:
may not be used as a means of gaining access to a man's
house or office and papers solely for the purpose of making
search to secure evidence to be used against him in a criminal or penal proceeding, but that they may be resorted to only when a primary right to such search and seizure may be
found in the interest which the public or the complainant
may have in the property to be seized, or in the right to the
possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the police power
renders possession of the property by the accused unlawful
and provides that it may be taken. 69

61

Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890).
62
Id. at 195 ("Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the
next step which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to the
individual what Judge Cooley calls the right 'to be let alone."').
63
Id. at 193 ("That the individual shall have full protection in person and in
property is a principle as old as the common law; but it has been found necessary
from time to time to define anew the exact nature and extent of such protection. Political, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society.").
64
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
65
The Court eventually eliminated any reliance on property rights as found
in Katz, relying only on the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test in United States
v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280 (1983).

66

See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case/or Caution, 102 MICH. L. REv. 801, 816 (2004) ("It is
generally agreed that before the 1960s, the Fourth Amendment was focused on the
protection of property rights against government interference.").
67
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (mentioning Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)).
68
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). The second provision of the
Fourth Amendment states: "and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized." Id.
69
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921) (emphasis added),
abrogated by Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
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V. THE NEED TO RETURN TO THE
MERE EVIDENCE RULE
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61

Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890).
62
Id. at 195 ("Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the
next step which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to the
individual what Judge Cooley calls the right 'to be let alone.'").
63
Id. at 193 ("That the individual shall have full protection in person and in
property is a principle as old as the common law; but it has been found necessary
from time to time to define anew the exact nature and extent of such protection. Political, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society.").
64
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
65
The Court eventually eliminated any reliance on property rights as found
in Katz, relying only on the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test in United States
v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280 (1983).

66

See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REv. 801, 816 (2004) ("It is
generally agreed that before the 1960s, the Fourth Amendment was focused on the
protection of property rights against government interference.").
67
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (mentioning Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)).
68
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). The second provision of the
Fourth Amendment states: "and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized." Id.
69
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921) (emphasis added),
abrogated by Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
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So unquestioned was this rule, that the Boyd decision observed
that it was not until 1863 that there even was any law in England or
the United States:

them, by imperceptible practice of courts or by well-intentioned, but
mistakenly over-zealous, executive officers." 73 Thus, the Gouled
Court ruled:

which authorized the search and seizure of a man's private
papers . . . for the purpose of using them in evidence against
him in a criminal case, or in a proceeding to enforce the forfeiture of his property. Even the ... obnoxious writs of assistance ... did not go as far as this .... 70

[S]earch warrants ... may not be used as a means of gaining access to a man's house or office and papers solely for
the purpose of making search to secure evidence to be
.
him .... 74
use d agamst
In a day when "over-zealous" and increasingly militarized law en-

The Boyd Court "noticed the intimate relation between" the
Fourth Amendment and the prohibition against compelled selfincrimination in the Fifth Amendment, both of which were protected
by the rule it adopted:
For the 'unreasonable searches and seizures' condemned in
the [F]ourth [A]mendment are almost always made for the
purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against
himself .... 71
In explaining the property principle undergirding the first freedom, as protected by the Fourth Amendment, the Boyd Court warned
that, although the evidence seized in that case complied with the warrant requirement:

[I]llegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first
footing ... by silent approaches and slight deviations from
legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A
close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right .... It is
the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional
rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto should be obsta principiis. 72
Thirty-six years later, in Gouled v. United States, the Court reaffirmed its belief that such a rule was required "to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or 'gradual depreciation' of the rights secured by
70

Boyd, 116 U.S. at 622-23.
Id. at 633 (emphasis added).
72
Id. at 635 (emphasis added) (discussing how constitutional rights can be
slowly eroded, and what courts should do to prevent such erosion).
71

forcement officers make tens of thousands of "dynamic entries" into
homes annually, 75 the full scope of the people's original Fourth
Amendment protections demonstrate the Founder's prescience.
VI. THE KATZ PRIVACY RULE WAS BASED ON A
REPUDIATION OF THE PROPERTY PRINCIPLE
Six months prior to Katz, the Supreme Court had abandoned its
well-established Fourth Amendment jurisprudence based upon proper73
Gouled, 255 U.S. at 304. See generally Bram v. United States, 168 U.S.
532, 544 (1897). See also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914).
74
Gouled, 255 U.S. at 309 (emphasis added) (discussing the acceptable use
of search warrants).
75
See RADLEY BALKO, CATO INST., OVERKILL: THE RISE OF p ARAMILITARY
POLICE RAIDS IN AMERICA 11 (2006), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/balko_whitepaper_2006.pdf (indicating that in
addition to innumerable news articles and web stories, a series of studies and popular
books have focused renewed attention on the militarization of police and the increasing use of "dynamic entry'' by SWAT teams into homes and businesses by law enforcement at all levels of government-estimated to be as high as 40,000 per year).
Videos detailing abusive SWAT team raids into homes and businesses circulate widely on the Internet. See, e.g., WCCO Television Report, SWAT Team Honored for
Raiding Wrong House, YouTUBE (July 29, 2008),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oFnmZK15WEA (depicting a SWAT team that
mistakenly raided the wrong home). See also Gibson Guitar Corp. Responds to Federal Raid, GIBSON (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.gibson.com/enus/Lifestyle/News/gibson-0825-201 l/ (observing the SWAT style entries utilized at
the Gibson guitar factory in order to seize Indian wood that was allegedly improperly
imported). See generally Go DIRECTLY TO JAIL: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ALMOST
EVERYTHING (Gene Healy, ed., CATO Inst. 2004); IN THE NAME OF JUSTICE, (Timothy
Lynch, ed., CATO Inst. 2009); PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS & LAWRENCE M. STRATTON,
THE TYRANNY OF GOOD INTENTIONS: How PROSECUTORS AND LAw ENFORCEMENT
ARE TRAMPLING THE CONSTITUTION IN THE NAME OF JUSTICE, (Forum 2000); PAUL
ROSENZWEIG AND BRIAN w. wALSH, ONE NATION UNDER ARREST: How CRAZY
LAWS, ROGUE PROSECUTORS, AND ACTIVIST JUDGES THREATEN YOUR LIBERTY, (Heritage Foundation 2010); HARVEY A. SILVERGLATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: How THE
FEDS TARGET THE INNOCENT, (Encounter Books 2011 ); .
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ty rights in favor of one rooted in an emerging right of privacy. In
Warden v. Hayden, 76 Justice William J. Brennan-writing for a bare
majority of five Justices-claimed dissatisfaction with the "fictional
and procedural barriers rest[ing] on property concepts," 77 and jettisoned the time-honored rule that a search for "mere evidence" was
per se "unreasonable." 78 Justice Brennan claimed that the distinction
between (i) "mere evidence" and (ii) "instrumentalities [of crime],
fruits [of crime] or contraband" was "based on premises no longer
accepted as rules governing the application of the Fourth Amendment." 79 Discarding the notion that the Fourth Amendment requires
80
the Government to demonstrate a "superior property interest" in the
thing to be seized, Justice Brennan promised that his new privacy ra81
tionale would free the Fourth Amendment from "irrational," "dis83
credited,"82 and "confus[ing]" decisions of the past, and more meaningfully ensure "the protection of privacy rather than property," which
is "the principal object of the Fourth Amendment." 84
Joined by Chief Justice Earl Warren, Justice Fortas concurred in
the result, but disagreed with "the majority's broad-and ... totally
1 " 85
. .
unnecessary-repudiat10n
of th e so-ca11ed ' mere ev1"dence ' rue.
Resting his concurrence on the long-established "hot pursuit" exception to the warrant requirement, 86 Justice Fortas sought to avoid "an
87
enormous and dangerous hole in the Fourth Amendment" :
[O]pposition to general searches is a fundamental of our heritage and of the history of Anglo-Saxon legal principles.
Such searches, pursuant to ''writs of assistance," were one
of the matters over which the American Revolution was
fought. The very purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to
outlaw such searches, which the Court today sanctions. I fear
that in gratuitously striking down the "mere evidence"
rule, which distinguished members of this Court have
acknowledged as essential to enforce the Fourth Amend76
77

78
79
80
81
82
83

84
85
86
87

Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
Id. at 304.
Id. at 295-97.
Id. at 300-01 (emphasis added).
Id. at 303-04.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 306.
Id. at 309.
Id. at 304.
Id. at 310 (Fortas, J., concurring).
Id. at 312.
Id. (emphasis added).
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ment' s prohibition against general searches, the Court today
needlessly destroys, root and branch, a basic part of liberty's heritage. 88
Had the Hayden Court not thrown out the "mere evidence" rule,
no warrant could lawfully have been issued to "covertly install and
monitor a global positioning system (GPS) tracking device on
[Jones's] Jeep Grand Cherokee." 89 According to the Government, the
sole purpose of such an installation was to gather evidence of the
movement of the vehicle. 90 Indeed, by introducing the data obtained
by means of such a device, the Government was, in effect, forcibly
collecting information about Jones' s movements for the sole purpose
of using such data as evidence against him. Although some of the
movements of Jones's jeep over a month-long surveillance period
may have been seen by third parties, including Government investigating agents, the very purpose of the GPS tracking system was to
chronicle only that which Jones himself would know-all of the
Jeep's movements over that same period. By extracting that information via the GPS device, the Government, in purpose, and in effect,
was compelling the defendant to testify against himself.
Having abandoned the "mere evidence" rule for the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" guideline, the Hayden Court opened the door
not only to a search warrant authorizing the installation of a GPS device, but to the implantation of such a device without a search warrant on the theory that there is no expectation of privacy as to a person's movements on a public highway. 91 Under this view, if there
were no such privacy expectation, then the Fourth Amendment would
cease to apply altogether, the Government having no need for probable cause or even reasonable suspicion to place a tracking device on
any automobile or even one's clothing.
VII. EXCHANGING PRIVACY FOR PROPERTY
USHERS IN THE DESTRUCTIVE GENERAL WARRANT

88

Id. (emphasis added).
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 3.
90
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 4 ("Using the device,
agents were able to track respondent's Jeep .... ").
91
If the Government has the right to place a GPS device on a citizen's automobile to gather movement data because no citizen has any reasonable expectation of
privacy, why should a citizen not have a reciprocal right to place a GPS on a government official's car? Surely the government official has no different expectation of
privacy. No doubt, however, if any citizen were to be so bold, the Government would
be quick to indict him, inter alia, for trespassing on government property.
89

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET

258

ty rights in favor of one rooted in an emerging right of privacy. In
Warden v. Hayden, 76 Justice William J. Brennan-writing for a bare
majority of five Justices-claimed dissatisfaction with the "fictional
and procedural barriers rest[ing] on property concepts," 77 and jettisoned the time-honored rule that a search for "mere evidence" was
per se "unreasonable." 78 Justice Brennan claimed that the distinction
between (i) "mere evidence" and (ii) "instrumentalities [of crime],
fruits [of crime] or contraband" was "based on premises no longer
accepted as rules governing the application of the Fourth Amendment."79 Discarding the notion that the Fourth Amendment requires
80
the Government to demonstrate a "superior property interest" in the
thing to be seized, Justice Brennan promised that his new privacy ra81
tionale would free the Fourth Amendment from "irrational," "dis83
credited,"82 and "confus[ing]" decisions of the past, and more meaningfully ensure "the protection of privacy rather than property," which
is "the principal object of the Fourth Amendment." 84
Joined by Chief Justice Earl Warren, Justice Fortas concurred in
the result, but disagreed with "the majority's broad-and ... totally
. . of the so-ca11ed ' mere ev1.dence ' ru1e. " 85
unnecessary-repudiat10n
Resting his concurrence on the long-established "hot pursuit" exception to the warrant requirement, 86 Justice Fortas sought to avoid "an
87
enormous and dangerous hole in the Fourth Amendment" :
[O]pposition to general searches is a fundamental of our heritage and of the history of Anglo-Saxon legal principles.
Such searches, pursuant to ''writs of assistance," were one
of the matters over which the American Revolution was
fought. The very purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to
outlaw such searches, which the Court today sanctions. I fear
that in gratuitously striking down the "mere evidence"
rule, which distinguished members of this Court have
acknowledged as essential to enforce the Fourth Amend76
77
78
79

80
81
82
83
84
85
86

87

Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
Id. at 304.
Id. at 295-97.
Id. at 300-01 (emphasis added).
Id. at 303-04.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 306.
Id. at 309.
Id. at 304.
Id. at 310 (Fortas, J., concurring).
Id. at 312.
Id. (emphasis added).

UNITED STATES V. JONES

[Vol. 3:2]

259

ment' s prohibition against general searches, the Court today
needlessly destroys, root and branch, a basic part of liberty's heritage. 88
Had the Hayden Court not thrown out the "mere evidence" rule,
no warrant could lawfully have been issued to "covertly install and
monitor a global positioning system (GPS) tracking device on
[Jones's] Jeep Grand Cherokee." 89 According to the Government, the
sole purpose of such an installation was to gather evidence of the
movement of the vehicle. 90 Indeed, by introducing the data obtained
by means of such a device, the Government was, in effect, forcibly
collecting information about Jones' s movements for the sole purpose
of using such data as evidence against him. Although some of the
movements of Jones's jeep over a month-long surveillance period
may have been seen by third parties, including Government investigating agents, the very purpose of the GPS tracking system was to
chronicle only that which Jones himself would know-all of the
Jeep's movements over that same period. By extracting that information via the GPS device, the Government, in purpose, and in effect,
was compelling the defendant to testify against himself.
Having abandoned the "mere evidence" rule for the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" guideline, the Hayden Court opened the door
not only to a search warrant authorizing the installation of a GPS device, but to the implantation of such a device without a search warrant on the theory that there is no expectation of privacy as to a person's movements on a public highway. 91 Under this view, if there
were no such privacy expectation, then the Fourth Amendment would
cease to apply altogether, the Government having no need for probable cause or even reasonable suspicion to place a tracking device on
any automobile or even one's clothing.
VII. EXCHANGING PRIVACY FOR PROPERTY
USHERS IN THE DESTRUCTIVE GENERAL WARRANT

88

Id. (emphasis added).
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 3.
90
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 4 ("Using the device,
agents were able to track respondent's Jeep .... ").
91
If the Government has the right to place a GPS device on a citizen's automobile to gather movement data because no citizen has any reasonable expectation of
privacy, why should a citizen not have a reciprocal right to place a GPS on a government official's car? Surely the government official has no different expectation of
privacy. No doubt, however, if any citizen were to be so bold, the Government would
be quick to indict him, inter alia, for trespassing on government property.
89

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET

260

[Vol. 3:2]

Just as Justice Fortas forecast, Justice Brennan's privacy rationale
has undermined the "Fourth Amendment's prohibition against general
searches." 92 The Government informed the Court in Jones "federal
law enforcement agencies frequently use tracking devices early in
investigations, before suspicions have ripened into probable cause." 93
As the Government also argued, applying the Fourth Amendment
would "prevent[] law enforcement officers from using GPS devices in
an effort to gather information to establish probable cause." 94 And
as the Government asserted, as a consequence, "the government's
ability to investigate leads and tips," will be "seriously impede[d]." 95
In short, the Government demanded that the Court sanction its unbridled discretion to search suspected driving activities, seizing data as to
the movement of vehicles on the public highways, in order to gather
enough information to establish probable cause to institute criminal
proceedings. The GPS technology, then, serves the Government in the
same way as the discredited general warrant-legitimizing intrusions
upon property without first having to demonstrate before a judicial
magistrate that it has "probable cause." Indeed, if there is no reasonable expectation of privacy, as the Government argued, then the warrant requirement would not even come into play, much less would the
Government be required to have "probable cause," or even "reasonable suspicion" to install a GPS on one's automobile.
The expectation of privacy rationale is deeply problematic. If the
Government were to announce and make known that it was recording
all cell phone calls, preserving copies of all e-mails, intercepting all
faxes, using cell phones to monitor conversations in a room even
when no call was in progress, and that it had entered into an agreement with OnStar, TomTom, and Garmin to monitor in real time the
position of all cars using that GPS equipment, one could say that no
American would have any reasonable expectation of privacy. According to the privacy theory then, no American would be able to claim
that a Fourth Amendment search or a seizure of those communications
or data transmissions was occurring.
Under the reasonable expectation of privacy test the Supreme
Court has overridden property rights by allowing warrantless searches
of commercial property, 96 and closely regulated industries, 97 and a
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private residence for violations of a housing code, 98 among others.
The Court's "expectation of privacy" test has proven wholly inadequate to the task of protecting the American people against invasions
of their privacy through unreasonable searches and seizures. Paradoxically, a return to the text and property basis of the Fourth Amendment would provide the people with the protection envisioned by the
Fourth Amendment's authors.
As the Boyd Court recalled, the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
against "unreasonable searches and seizures" was the direct product of
the government practice:
of issuing writs of assistance to the revenue officers, empowering them, in their discretion, to search suspected places for smuggled goods, which James Otis pronounced 'the
worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of
English liberty and the fundamental principles of law,
that ever was found in an English law book. "' 99
In his classic Treatise on Constitutional Limitations, renowned
constitutional scholar, Thomas Cooley, ranked the Fourth Amendment
guarantee of "citizen immunity in his home against the prying eyes of
the Government, and protection in person, property, and papers
against even the process of law" next in importance to the constitutional ban on personal slavery. 100
The Fourth Amendment pronounces that "persons," "houses,"
"papers," and "effects" are equally secured from unreasonable searches and seizures. Each is a right of the people best protected by the
enduring, unchanging common law rules of private property, not by a
modem privacy chameleon invented by judges.

97

92
93
94

See Hayden, 387 U.S. at 312 (Fortas, J., concurring).
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 23.
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 23 (italics original, bold

added).
95
96

See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 23 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602 (1981).
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See, e.g.,NewYorkv. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 712 (1987) Gunkyard); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972) (federal firearms dealers); Colonnade
Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970) (liquor industry).
98
See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
99
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886) (emphasis added).
lOO THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 365 (5th
ed. 1883) (emphasis added).
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In his classic Treatise on Constitutional Limitations, renowned
constitutional scholar, Thomas Cooley, ranked the Fourth Amendment
guarantee of "citizen immunity in his home against the prying eyes of
the Government, and protection in person, property, and papers
against even the process of law" next in importance to the constitutional ban on personal slavery. 100
The Fourth Amendment pronounces that "persons," "houses,"
"papers," and "effects" are equally secured from unreasonable searches and seizures. Each is a right of the people best protected by the
enduring, unchanging common law rules of private property, not by a
modem privacy chameleon invented by judges.
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92

93

94

See Hayden, 387 U.S. at 312 (Fortas, J., concurring).
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 23.
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 23 (italics original, bold

added).
95
96

See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 23 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602 (1981).
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See, e.g.,New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 712 (1987) Gunkyard); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972) (federal firearms dealers); Colonnade
Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970) (liquor industry).
98
See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
99
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886) (emphasis added).
loo THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 365 (5th
ed. 1883) (emphasis added).
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NOTES
"HOSTILE LEARNING
ENVIRONMENT:" DEVELOPING
STUDENT SPEECH REGULATION BY
APPLYING THE HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT ANALYSIS TO
CYBERBULLYING
By Carla DiBlasio*
INTRODUCTION

Lindsey is a sixteen-year-old sophomore who logs onto her Facebook1 page once she gets home from school. Lindsey updates her status and writes on her Facebook wall, "Amy is a fat cow. Don't ever
talk to that cow, just tell her MOO." Katie is a fourteen-year-old
eighth grade student at the same school. She decides to update her
Facebook status after school and writes, "In case you didn't already
know it, I'm the S*#%. Everyone else should go to hell." Are these
instances where Lindsey and Katie are protected by their First
Amendment free speech rights? Or, may their public school district
punish them for their cyber speech?
* J.D. candidate, 2012, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
Associate Coordinator, Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet; President, International Law Society. I offer special thanks to my sister, Christina DiBlasio, whose
incredible strength and integrity helped to inspire the topic of this Note. I would like
to extend additional thanks to a mentor, Beth Rankin, who always inspires grammatical diligence and academic excellence.
1
Facebook is a social networking website that is operated and privately
owned by Facebook, Inc. In addition to other functions, users may create a personal
profile, add other users as friends, exchange messages, and join common interest
groups. As of December 2011, Facebook has more than 845 million active users,
which is about one person for every eight in the world. See Facebook Fact Sheet, at
http://www.facebook.com/press/info .php ?factsheet.
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